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Abstract
Interpersonal relationships can be fragile. The mere perception
of opportunistic behavior can lead to a breakdown in coopera-
tion. Once damaged, the question then arises as to whether and
how cooperation might be restored. Noncooperative game the-
ory raises serious doubts about the possibilities, although inter-
actional justice and impression management research have
shown that verbal explanations can dampen reactions to aver-
sive behavior. Philosophical, anthropological, and ethological
research all suggest that genuine forgiveness may require some-
thing more tangible and substantive than an explanation. Thus,
the current experiment investigated the effects of explanations
and varying forms of substantive amends on the restoration of
mutual cooperation. The results confirm that rebuilding coop-
eration is feasible. Apologies and simple explanations can be
effective to a degree, though substantive amends have signifi-
cantly more positive effects than explanations alone. In contrast
to prior findings on interactional justice, acknowledgments were
more effective than denials in repairing short interactions. This
research demonstrates that, once breached, cooperation can be
reestablished and that actions as well as explanations and apol-
ogies can augment the process in important and sometimes sub-
tle ways.
(Relationship; Talk; Forgiveness)
To err is human, to forgive divine; to forget is stupid.
Author Unknown
The rapid proliferation of new, flatter, and more flexible
forms of organization have placed an added premium on
the ability to build and maintain mutually beneficial
working relationships within and across organizational
boundaries (Child and McGrath 2001). Business partner-
ships between erstwhile competitors (e.g., Toyota and
General Motors, Astra and Merck, Sony and Phillips)
carry great opportunities along with clear temptations. As
one senior biotechnology executive noted, formal part-
nerships are “only the tip of the iceberg—they exclude
dozens of handshake deals and informal collaborations as
well as probably hundreds of collaborations by our com-
pany’s scientists with colleagues elsewhere” (Powell et
al. 1996, p. 120). Powell et al. conclude that cultivating
and managing such complicated relationships is essential
to innovation in R&D-intensive industries. Larson (1992)
observed that interorganizational relationships generally
grow from and depend on personal relationships between
individuals. The ability to build, maintain, and repair co-
operative interactions has become a critical management
competency (Lewicki and Bunker 1996).
Commercial interactions depend on the mutual fulfill-
ment of the individual parties’ expectations of each other
and their actions. As expectations are repeatedly fulfilled
by actions, accumulating rewards are likely to cement the
perception of an implicit agreement between the parties,
i.e., an implicit contract (Rousseau and McLean Parks
1993). The perceptual nature of these implicit agree-
ments them an inherent fragility (e.g., Bettenhausen and
Murnighan 1985). Actions that violate cooperative ex-
pectations can have serious consequences. Minor depar-
tures may foster concern. Major departures may be per-
ceived as exploitation, generate strong emotional
reactions, and can sever relationships so that future bene-
fits are lost (Bottom et al. 1996, Murnighan 1981). Larson
(1992) found that the dissolution of a partnership in an
entrepreneurial alliance had even broader ramifications,
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causing reputational damage that reduced the ability to
conduct business with other firms.
Disappointment and anger can lead to the dissolution
of relations or even to desires for vengeance (Bradfield
and Aquino 1999, McCornack and Levine 1990). Should
one party’s actions seriously threaten the continuation of
a rewarding interaction—inside, outside, or between or-
ganizational actors—one or both of the parties may seek
to reestablish the connection so they can continue to re-
ceive the benefits it offers. Rebuilding cooperation may
prove difficult, however: Retribution, resentment, and
guilt can present immediate obstacles. In certain situa-
tions, the aggrieved party may actually be the one to seek
to rebuild cooperation (Bies and Tripp 1996). In other
instances, all parties may mutually seek repair. But in
many cases it will be the party that caused the breach who
realizes their mistake and seeks to return to the past and
its joint benefits (Goffman 1971). This last situation is the
domain of the current research.
While our theory considers the broader concept of re-
lationships and their potential, our research investigates
initial interactions. The context of our experiment is a
potentially profitable interpersonal interaction, making it
relevant to many forms of organizational interactions: be-
tween the members of the same organization, agents of
different organizations (e.g., Larson’s 1992 network dy-
ads), or between cohesive groups in which the parties can
mutually benefit from cooperation.
A great deal of research has addressed both the initia-
tion of relations and the attitudes that are associated with
damaged interactions. Much less has focused on the
mechanisms involved in restoring cooperation. As de
Waal (1989) notes, most conflicts do not simply destroy
relations. Rather, they generate tension followed by either
reconciliation or withdrawal. Here we investigate
whether two parties can cope with this tension in a way
that restores the dynamics of mutually cooperative inter-
action after one party has disrupted it. We investigate the
response to and the effectiveness of several different
forms of penance in this restoration process.
As a backdrop for the current research, we briefly re-
view two streams of literature that have addressed dam-
aged relationships. The first focuses on the early inter-
actions in repeated prisoners’ and social dilemmas (for a
recent review see Komorita and Parks 1999). The second
concerns perceptions of justice in interpersonal contexts,
i.e., interactional justice (e.g., Bies and Moag 1986). Our
primary focus differs from past research by investigating
the effects of different forms of substantive amends, or
penance, on the potential restoration of mutual coopera-
tion. We also draw on the philosophical literature on for-
giveness and ethnographic and ethological studies of rit-
ualized social behavior to create a theoretical foundation
for our experiment. Thus, this study tests a series of prop-
ositions on the efficacy of different forms and processes
of penance in restoring and rebuilding cooperation.
Cooperative Interaction
We start with a basic assumption that cooperative inter-
actions are mutually desirable for parties that are not in
direct competition. The structure of most interactions,
particularly between organizational actors, includes the
possibility for joint benefit or loss. In the early stages, the
parties may have considerable uncertainty about each
other’s intentions and likely actions and, in particular,
whether the interaction will be positive (Lewicki et al.
1998). People often realize that early cooperative choices
can entail considerable risk: When they meet a nonco-
operative choice by the other party, a cooperator may
suffer considerable personal and/or organizational losses.
However, if neither party acts cooperatively, the chances
for future benefits can quickly diminish.
This description of potentially cooperative interactions
and its similarity to prisoners’ dilemma games is no co-
incidence: The empirical research we report here uses the
prisoners’ dilemma for its basic structure. Game-theoretic
models of repeated play in prisoners’ dilemmas (Roth and
Murnighan 1978, Axelrod and Hamilton 1981) determine
when it makes rational sense for the parties to choose
cooperatively. If (1) each party’s actions are contingent
on the other party’s actions, (2) the interaction has a high
probability of continuing, and (3) the payoffs for coop-
eration are sufficient, then mutual cooperation makes ra-
tional sense. In any prisoners’ dilemma situation, non-
cooperation is also a rational choice.
When one party in an interaction makes even the small-
est cooperative move and the other party notices and re-
ciprocates, they give themselves an opportunity to in-
crease joint gains. Mutually beneficial outcomes can
quickly lead to expectations of further cooperation and a
growing sense that the other is obligated to continue co-
operating (Bottom et al. 1996). This pattern establishes
the foundation for a cooperative psychological contract
and confidence that the counterparts share similar or even
identical perceptions of the situation (Rousseau and
McLean Parks 1993). Localized social norms then
become an explicit reality (e.g., Bettenhausen and
Murnighan 1985), further cementing expectations and in-
creasing the likelihood of future cooperation.
In dilemma experiments involving a long series of
choices, the general tendency is for the parties to gravitate
to one of two stable states: mutual cooperation or mutual
noncooperation (Pilisuk et al. 1967). Several underlying
dynamics seem to enable negotiators to shift from a stable
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noncooperative state to cooperation. Individuals who be-
lieve that they are seen as competent or who feel that they
can influence the system are more likely to be coopera-
tive. Common illusory beliefs in such influence can even
generate cooperation in a one-trial game (Hayashi et al.
1999). However Pilisuk et al. (1967) showed that simply
providing opportunities for communication between the
players did not necessarily increase cooperation, because
these opportunities were frequently used to deceive.
Lindskold (1978) proposed that cooperative interac-
tions would only develop with the appropriate combination
of verbal messages and behavioral choices. Lindskold et
al. (1983) investigated patterns of choice and communi-
cation that might encourage an otherwise competitively
inclined person to act cooperatively. They found that a
combination of conciliatory choice initiatives, general
and specific cooperative messages, and measured retali-
ation could best generate cooperation. Lindskold et al.
(1986) further found that this combination could improve
cooperative interactions that had been damaged by
threats, insults, or challenges by one of the parties. They
noted that while specific messages helped, a general note
of cooperation that accompanied conciliatory acts worked
best. As to actions, Hayashi (1993) has shown that a
cooperate-then-exit strategy, that is, to cooperate uncon-
ditionally until a counterpart defects, is particularly ef-
fective at generating cooperation when coupled with a
type of forgiveness mechanism (forgive after three rounds
in this particular experiment).
The Importance of Talk
Research on interactive justice also highlights the impor-
tance of communication in building cooperation, espe-
cially when it signals intent. Goffman’s (1971) analysis
of intent and its effects indicates that “there is no act
whose meaning is independent of reasons understood for
its occurrence” and further that “the perception of an act
. . . is dependent on an assessment of intent” (p. 110).
Throwing someone to the ground to impede him from
stepping on a just-cleaned floor is an offense. Doing so
to prevent him from being shot by a sniper changes the
meaning of the act completely. If the negative conse-
quences of an action are unforseeable, this may also mit-
igate the perception and experience of guilt.
Wrongdoers’ verbal characterizations of their acts can
shape an injured party’s interpretation of the wrongdoers’
intentions, which in turn can affect subsequent reactions
(Mehlman and Snyder 1985). Bies et al. (1988) found that
accounts identifying external causes helped blunt future
conflict and reduce negative reactions to harm. Shapiro
(1991) found that external explanations (suggesting that
the event was unintentional) led to reductions in disap-
proval, perceived injustice, and the desire to punish, and
to more forgiveness. Bies and Shapiro (1987) showed that
the perceived adequacy of an explanation was critical in
reducing negative reactions. Goffman (1971), however,
made it clear that explanations must provide sufficient
substance—they must match the severity of the offense—
to be believable. Shapiro et al.’s (1994) results concur,
showing that explanations were less effective when the
damaged party had suffered severe consequences.
These two streams of research have produced a wealth
of findings relevant to the current issues. Dilemma re-
search has used carefully controlled experiments to ex-
amine the likelihood of generating cooperative behavior
under difficult circumstances. Justice research has distin-
guished different dimensions of the explanations given
for actions and their psychological impact on aggrieved
parties. Each stream suggests that communication and ac-
tion both promote cooperation. The combination of the
two may be most potent. The research on interactional
justice further suggests that explanations that identify
specific external attributions as causes are likely to be
most effective.
Neither stream of research, however, has directly ex-
amined the central issues in the current project. Dilemma
research has focused on establishing cooperation rather
than on rebuilding it. Interactional justice research has
concentrated on attitudinal and emotional reactions rather
than on subsequent behavior or reconciliation. The cur-
rent study draws from both literatures to investigate the
consequences of disrupting cooperation and subsequent
attempts to enact its restoration. To control for other fac-
tors, we investigated interactions that share a common
sequence of events from initial origin to breach. The in-
teractions begin positively and are then threatened by one
party’s unexpected actions. We examine the impact of
two different explanations for the breach and several
forms of substantive amends and assess their impact on
attitudes, emotional reactions, and behavior.
Penance and Forgiveness
Rebuilding cooperation may depend, in addition to ret-
ribution, on satisfying both parties’ demands of each
other. If an injured party does not desire revenge, they
may instead look for injurers to repent (Bradfield and
Aquino 1999). Similarly, many injurers may hope that
the people they have injured will forgive them. Reestab-
lishing previous cooperation, then, may require substan-
tive and emotive concessions by both parties (North
1987).
Social rituals for rebuilding damaged relationships are
common among human (Boehm 1984, Koch et al. 1977,
Sigmund 1999) and other highly social animal societies
(de Waal 1989, Schenkel 1967). Social groups that lack
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formal institutions for the enforcement of laws and the
resolution of conflict use rituals to smooth social func-
tioning and prevent dangerous escalation and violent re-
taliation (Arno 1976, Boehm 1984). Ritual practices typ-
ically include acknowledgment of the harmful act and the
offering of a gift or some symbol of repentance. The tra-
ditional Fijian ritual known as i soro calls for a gift of
either a bag of kava or a piece of whalebone (Arno 1976).
Most rituals also entail a degree of vulnerability or sub-
mission. In Boehm’s (1984) history of Montenegrin
tribes, several lengthy and destructive feuds ended with
a delegate of one clan crawling on hands and knees to-
ward the rival clan while offering an apology. The hu-
miliation of the ritual was so great that the receiving party
generally rushed toward the penitent to accept their offer
and put an end to the shame.
A serious obstacle to any reconciliation is when the two
parties entertain different conceptions of the severity of
a transgression and what constitutes fair recompense
(e.g., Thompson and Loewenstein 1992). Injurers may
feel that a signal of their renewed good intentions is suf-
ficient. The injured may desire complete reparation for all
that they have lost—and possibly a further penalty as
well. At a minimum, they may require that the injurer
suffer some substantive cost (e.g., a fine or reduction of
wages or bonuses). Arno (1976) describes the case of a
young Fijian who had gotten inebriated and then loudly
insulted, in public, the “talking chief” of the island over
his alleged incompetence. Though he had already offered
the reconciliation ritual i soro to several others he insulted
that evening, the young man informed Arno that the par-
ticulars of this case did not oblige him to do so. The chief
held a different view and filed charges of drunk and dis-
orderly conduct with the local police. The transgressor
hastily offered i soro and the chief dropped the complaint,
noting to Arno that he had been hoping the young man
would take this initiative all along.
Experimental studies of impression management (e.g.,
Schwartz et al. 1978) also indicate that the expression of
remorse following a wrongful act can mitigate punish-
ment. Because the sincerity of any verbal apology is
rarely certain, however, the payment of penance may be
necessary to validate an apology. In game-theoretic
terms, an apology without an objective penitential act
may be (and be interpreted as) cheap talk. Cheap talk is
unverifiable, costless communication from a self-
interested party (Farrell and Gibbons 1989; Pillutla and
Murnighan 1995). Without validation, a forgiver who
trusts cheap talk risks suffering further wrong from the
same party.
Forgiveness does not mean denying, condoning, or for-
getting wrongdoing. It acknowledges the event by releas-
ing negative feelings and replacing them with a sense of
goodwill toward the transgressor (Thoreson et al. 1998).
Forgiveness requires effort from the person who was orig-
inally wronged and may entail at least as much risk as
initial cooperation in a new interaction, but it also gives
people the opportunity to rebuild cooperative relations,
reduce negative affect, and increase positive affect
(Witvliet et al. 2001). It should manifest itself most
clearly in a willingness to consider engaging in future
interactions with the transgressor.
This suggests that an apology, substantive penance, and
forgiveness may all be necessary for rebuilding cooper-
ation. If any of the three are missing, the relationship may
be unbalanced, fragile, and in danger of dissolution. This
conclusion differs from those suggested by interactional
justice research, which concentrates on verbal explana-
tions and accounts, and from game theory, which sug-
gests that actions are what matters. Prior to introducing
an experiment to investigate the need for verbal or sub-
stantive action (or both), we first formulate a set of more
formal hypotheses.
Hypotheses
Evidence has repeatedly shown that effective explana-
tions can dampen negative emotions and attitudes. Ex-
planations are also likely to be helpful in the process of
rebuilding cooperation. An open question addressed in
the current study is whether an explanation can have more
than an affective and perceptual impact and result in an
actual return to cooperative behavior that involves risk or
cost. We tested these ideas by investigating explanations
that either acknowledged or denied intent after one party
behaved noncooperatively in a previously cooperative in-
teraction.
Dilemma research suggests that explanations alone will
not be able to regenerate cooperative behavior. A harm-
doer may claim lack of intent simply to avoid a negative
reaction, not because it is true (e.g., Elsbach 1994, Scott
and Lyman 1968). Models of cheap talk suggest that
words alone should have no impact on cooperation, re-
gardless of their intent (Farrell and Gibbons 1989).
If we expect an individual’s affect to be consistent with
his or her actions, then the implications of interactional
justice (that explanations will have a favorable perceptual
effect) and of dilemma research (that explanations will
not influence behavior) present a puzzling contradiction.
To deal with this inconsistency, we state our first hypoth-
esis positively, with the understanding that if it is sup-
ported, it provides additional behavioral support for in-
teractional justice. If it is not, it provides additional
perceptual support for game theory and for dilemma re-
search.
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HYPOTHESIS 1. Verbal explanations after a breach will
have a positive effect on a harmed individual’s affective
reactions and on the interacting individuals’ subsequent
cooperative behavior.
We can refine this hypothesis, following the interac-
tional justice literature, by considering intent. Prior theory
and research suggest that explanations evoking external
attributions will be effective at mitigating the perceived
damage of a negative, perceptually unjust outcome:
HYPOTHESIS 2. An explanation for a breach of coop-
eration that denies intent will generate more positive af-
fective reactions and more cooperation than an expla-
nation that acknowledges intent.
We have noted that the philosophical, anthropological,
and ethological literature all indicate that something more
than an explanation is needed to achieve forgiveness.
Wilson (1988) argues that reconciliation requires pen-
ance. The most general form of penance requires that the
party seeking forgiveness offer the other party a fixed
payment. Reciprocity models require that penance equal
the injured party’s costs, i.e., the ancient logic of “a tooth
for a tooth.” Thus, tit-for-tat (Axelrod and Hamilton
1984) immediately penalizes but immediately forgives
following a return to cooperation. Yet suffering equal
costs may not provide an injured party with full psycho-
logical and emotional recompense. Boehm (1984), for in-
stance, has shown that Montenegrin scoring rules for
feuds were clear and well understood: A clan that had lost
one life should take either two lives or the life of a higher-
status member from the other clan.
The experience of a loss may leave a continuing residue
of inequity (e.g., Shapiro et al. 1994). Whether partial
retribution can overcome potentially inequitable feelings
to help restore long-term cooperation is an open empirical
question that we test here. A simple model of reinforce-
ment learning or of impression management (Schlenker
1980) would suggest that quantity is critical, i.e., that
more substantive penance is likely to be more effective
than less. This suggests:
HYPOTHESIS 3. Substantive offers of penance will gen-
erate more positive affective reactions and more coop-
eration than statements of apology without penance.
HYPOTHESIS 4. Larger substantive offers of penance
will generate more positive affective reactions and more
cooperation than smaller substantive offers.
Contextual Factors
Because the interpretation of a message depends on its
context, the parties’ interaction history should interact
with the content of their messages to determine their ef-
fectiveness. Context may, for instance, affect the likeli-
hood that a victim will believe a denial. Disbelief could
provoke even harsher negative reactions than an initial
negative act (Scott and Lyman 1968). Thus, explanations
that lack credibility might make future cooperation even
more difficult (cf., Bies and Shapiro 1987).
Ongoing relationships are multifaceted and can vary in
many respects. Here we focus on one of an interaction’s
most basic and universal dimensions, its duration
(Krackhardt 1992). As individuals begin to interact, they
may feel considerable ambivalence because uncertainty
about each other’s intentions and actions is at its peak
(Lewicki et al. 1998). A repeatedly cooperative interac-
tion can reduce uncertainty and reassure both parties.
Questions about the others’ intentions (e.g., “Can I really
depend on them to deliver on time?”) become less salient
after repeated positive experiences (e.g., “They have
come through before. There’s no reason to think that they
won’t come through now.”). In contrast, the interpretation
of noncooperative behavior may depend on an interac-
tion’s history. Admission of noncooperative intent early
in an interaction can resolve the doubts of a victimized
party, albeit negatively, while an attempt to deny intent
may seem transparent and opportunistic (e.g., “Why
should I believe such a lame excuse?”).
Expectations of others’ intentions solidify as inter-
actions lengthen. With a cooperative history, a denial
of intent may go unquestioned (e.g., “We knew they
couldn’t have meant to do that”). Komorita and Mechling
(1967), for instance, found that a breach in cooperation
was less damaging (in terms of future cooperation) after
ten mutually cooperative choices than it was after four.
In contrast, an admission of intent following a long his-
tory of cooperation may be so unexpected as to be per-
ceived as a genuine violation (Morrison and Robinson
1997). Such perceptions not only incur cognitive adjust-
ments but can also have profound emotional impact (e.g.,
“How could they have done that after all that we have
accomplished?”). Thus, admissions of intent are likely to
be much more devastating for interactions with a longer
history.
This analysis provides the basis for two hypotheses:
HYPOTHESIS 5. Following a short history of cooper-
ative interaction, a denial of uncooperative intent will
lead to more negative affective reactions and less sub-
sequent cooperation than an acknowledgment of intent.
HYPOTHESIS 6. Following a longer history of cooper-
ative interaction, a denial of uncooperative intent will
lead to more positive affective reactions and more co-
operation than an acknowledgment of intent.
WILLIAM P. BOTTOM, KEVIN GIBSON, STEVEN E. DANIELS, AND J. KEITH MURNIGHAN Rebuilding Cooperation
502 ORGANIZATION SCIENCE/Vol. 13, No. 5, September–October 2002
Procedural justice research has also demonstrated that
people are more willing to accept poor outcomes when
they perceive that the allocation process was fair (Folger
1993, Brockner and Wiesenfeld 1996). In contrast, neg-
ative outcomes resulting from an unfair process lead to
perceptions of injustice and, in many cases, attempts at
retaliation or redistribution. The justice literature also
suggests that people will be more accepting of what they
view as an unfair outcome if they have a chance to con-
tribute to the process, even if the negative outcome stands
(Hirschmann 1970).
In 1919, the Allied and Associated Nations convened
in Paris to consider what reparations to demand of Ger-
many for the damage it had inflicted during World War
I. After extended deliberation and bargaining, the dele-
gates ultimately decided that no fixed sum they could
specify would prove satisfactory to their constituents.
They devised instead a provision whereby Germany
would commit to an open-ended obligation for paying
reparation demands by the Allies. This provision proved
to be very damaging to postwar relations and to Ger-
many’s fledgling democracy (Bottom 2001). It is con-
ceivable, however, that some similar open form of pen-
ance might have played a constructive role had it been
initiated by Germany, the culpable party, rather than im-
posed by the Allies. The significance of voice (Hirschman
1970) suggests that the most successful approach to sub-
stantive forgiveness may actually be an open-ended of-
fering of penance. With such an offer in hand, the harmed
party can specify the recompense that they desire and can
exact as much penalty as they wish, completely control-
ling equity restoration.
Such a formula mitigates egocentric bias (Thompson
and Loewenstein 1992) on the part of the wrongdoer,
gives voice to the injured, and allows them to actively
participate in the resolution process (Lowin 1968). Be-
cause this approach has not been systematically investi-
gated before, we cannot predict the size of the penalty
that wronged parties will seek. It is clear, however, that
open offers of penance expose the offering party to sig-
nificant risk. Yet with many species of primate and ca-
nine, it appears to be precisely this assumption of risk and
the act of open-ended offering that is of primary impor-
tance to the forgiveness process, especially because se-
rious physical measures of revenge are infrequently ex-
acted (de Waal 1989). Boehm (1984) observed that
receiving clans would often leave unclaimed the consid-
erable blood money offered as part of the pacification of
feuds. Instead, they would take pains to demonstrate that
it was the symbolism of the offering that mattered. One
of the longest recorded feuds ended with the leader of the
aggrieved clan taking only one gun, the one which had
killed his brother, from a huge cache of weapons they had
been offered by their enemies. If risk bearing, the oppor-
tunity for participation, and voice each have value, open
offers of penance should diminish the need for a substan-
tive penalty to equal the costs of an initial harm. This
suggests the following hypotheses:
HYPOTHESIS 7. Open offers of substantive penance will
generate more positive affective reactions and more co-
operation than fixed substantive penance.
HYPOTHESIS 8. In response to an open offer of penance,
injured parties will request less payment than the costs
originally imposed by the harm.
Methods
Experimental Design
The wealth of prior data on behavior in repeated prison-
ers’ dilemmas provides a ready benchmark to assess co-
operative behavior. The dilemma has also been used as a
model for many kinds of interpersonal interactions, in-
cluding those between individuals working together
within an organization (Kramer et al. 1996) and those
between purchasing agents and sales agents for different
organizations (Heide and Miner 1992).
In the present study, the dilemma required participants
to make a series of (cooperative or noncooperative)
choices that accumulated points and determined their
chances for a bonus of $10. Points were displayed in a
2x2 matrix with value-neutral labels for their choices.
Player A chose “Up” or “Down;” Player B chose “Left”
or “Right.” Up-Left (the payoff for mutual cooperation)
yielded 3.6 points for each player; Down-Right (the pun-
ishment for mutual defection) yielded 0.03 points for
each. Down-Left gave 4 points to Player A and none to
B; Up-Right yielded the reverse.
To study the rebuilding of damaged interactions we
needed to create uniform cooperative conditions and then
systematically introduce a breach. We primed partici-
pants’ initial choices by having them read “A Tutorial on
Cooperation” at the start of the experiment. This was a
condensed version of the text in Murnighan (1991, pp.
13–27) describing the benefits of cooperation in repeated
prisoners’ dilemmas. (The full passage is available from
the authors upon request.) Three pilot sessions testing in-
structions and instrumentation demonstrated that the
priming was effective, yielding uniform initial coopera-
tion. Participants’ “opponents” were actually a program
that further encouraged early cooperation by making the
same choice, each round, that participants made. Thus,
we created an environment where a cooperative interac-
tion would emerge. Then we manipulated the duration of
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the interaction prior to the breach, which was followed
by various forms of explanations and penance.
Explanations. The first verbal statement following the
breach of cooperation provided an explanation for the act
that either acknowledged or denied intent. For denials,
the program sent the following written message: “I didn’t
mean to do that; the experimenter took the wrong card.”
For acknowledgments, the program sent this message in-
stead: “I must admit that I meant to do that; I was just
trying to do a little better for myself.”
The denial placed blame on the experimenter and de-
nied personal responsibility. This message, however, was
potentially ambiguous: Its claim could be either accepted
or questioned. In contrast, the acknowledgment, “I was
just trying to do better for myself,” clearly accepts re-
sponsibility and admits intent. This admission, however,
does not necessarily provide a good reason for the breach.
It fails to excuse because pure self-interest provides nei-
ther justifiable (Mills 1995) nor acceptable grounds for
breaking an implicit agreement. It is at best an example
of what Konovsky and Jaster (1989) called a “weak ex-
cuse.”
Penance. Across all conditions, the sequence of actions
and messages following the breach and the acknowledg-
ment or denial of intent was identical. After four addi-
tional rounds of noncooperative choices (paired with in-
nocuous messages; see Table 1) to extinguish
cooperation, the program sent each participant a verbal
apology and a request to return to cooperation, i.e., “I am
sorry for doing this. I think we should go back to coop-
eration.” The penance manipulation followed this mes-
sage. The four penance conditions were: (1) mere talk: “I
would be willing to do this if you are;” (2) small penance:
“I would be willing to play Left on the next round and
let you play Down,” i.e., offering one round of maximum
payoffs for the participant; (3) large penance: “I would
be willing to play Left on the next two rounds and let you
play Down,” i.e., offering two rounds of maximum pay-
offs; or (4) an open-ended offer of penance: “What will
it take for you to cooperate again?”
Duration. We manipulated the duration of the inter-
action by varying the number of rounds prior to the
breach. We chose 5 rounds for the short condition to give
participants enough experience to formulate expectations
about each other, but not necessarily firm expectations,
and 15 rounds for the long condition to allow participants
to establish more certainty about each other. Breaching
at 15 rounds also guarded against potential fatigue. Ex-
perience in similar experiments (e.g., Kahn and
Murnighan 1993) with similar populations suggested that
these manipulations were reasonable.
Following the breach, a programmed message either
acknowledged or denied intent. The program then made
a second pair of noncooperative choices, with the follow-
ing message in all conditions: “I was worried that you
would choose Down this time so I chose Right.” It then
made a third pair of noncooperative choices, with this
message: “I am just trying to protect myself.”
After the apology and offer of penance, the penance
was delivered in the following four rounds. Then the ex-
perimenter announced that the interaction would end after
five more rounds. This changed the situation from a re-
peated interaction with an uncertain end to one with a
certain, finite end. Noncooperative game theory predicts
that rational players will neither cooperate nor expect co-
operation on the last round, as there is no further chance
for retribution. Given this expectation, the same logic
suggests that they should not cooperate nor expect co-
operation on the next-to-last round either. Applying the
same logic to prior rounds creates a process of backwards
induction (Stahl 1972) and the conclusion that the only
rational choice on every finite round is noncooperation.
Thus, the last five rounds provide a critical behavioral
test for the effectiveness of different forms of penance:
Any cooperation on these rounds is a strong indication of
the successful rebuilding of cooperation.
Participants
A total of 225 students from the undergraduate and MBA
programs at Washington University in St. Louis volun-
teered to participate for the opportunity to earn up to $10
for a one-hour experiment, with a guaranteed minimum
of $3. Ages ranged from 19 to 47, averaging 22; 151 were
males; 74 were females; 145 were undergraduates; 56
were MBAs; 4 were Ph.D.s. Most participants were either
Caucasian or Asian American; 32 were Asian; 6 were
African-American; 5 were European; 2 were South
American.
Procedure
Each session included between 4 and 10 participants, al-
ways run with even numbers. Sessions were randomly
assigned to the experimental conditions. Each participant
sat in a cubicle, preventing observation of the actions of
the experimenter or other participants. Participants read
the cooperation tutorial as the experimenter read it aloud;
they then read the experimental instructions.
Although all participants were actually Player As and
all Player Bs were fictitious, participants were led to be-
lieve that half of the participants at their session were
Player Bs. Player As chose either Up or Down; Bs chose
Right or Left. Players earned experimental points accord-
ing to the payoffs described previously (3.6 each for mu-
tual cooperation; 0.03 each for mutual defection; 4.0 was
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2 Left Keep it up. Left Keep it up.
3 Left Left
4 Left Keep up the good work. Left Keep up the good work.
5 Left Left
6 Right Left
7 Right [Intent Manipulation] Left This is going well.
8 Right Left
9 Right I didn’t think I could choose left Left This is definitely the way to go.
because I thought you’d pick down.
10 Right Left
11 Right I felt I had to protect myself. Left I see no reason to stop.
12 Right Left
13 Right [Penance Form Manipulation] Left I’m happy to continue this way.
14 Small/large penance/bargainers choices Left
15 Large penance/bgr.’s choices Left This is smooth sailing.
16 Bargainers’ Choices Right
17 Bargainers’ Choices Right [Intent Manipulation]
18 Bargainers’ Choices—Last Round Right
19 Right I didn’t think I could choose left
because I thought you’d pick down.
20–28 Duplicates Short Interaction Rounds 10–18
the temptation to deflect; 0 was the sucker’s payoff). Par-
ticipants were told that the points they accumulated
would determine their chances of winning a $10 payoff.
Their outcome would be based on the roll of a 100-sided
die, which was shown to all participants. They would win
the $10 if the roll resulted in any number between zero
and the total number of points they had earned. The in-
structions emphasized that their chances of winning $10
depended on their ability to accumulate points and on the
roll of the die.
The instructions also indicated that the experiment
would terminate with a probability of 0.07. Following
every round, the 100-sided die was rolled; if a number
between one and seven resulted, the experiment ended.
They were told that if the interaction did not terminate
for some time, the experimenter would announce the last
round with considerable forewarning. In fact, the exper-
imenter controlled the number of rounds, regardless of
the roll of the die: The exact number depended on the
duration and penance conditions and the end was always
announced, five rounds hence (see Table 1).
The instructions and other characteristics of the inter-
action were constructed to encourage cooperative choices
on the early rounds of play. The combination of payoffs
and the probability of continuing led to a g index, which
computes the expected values from cooperation in a re-
peated prisoner’s dilemma (Murnighan and Roth 1983).
In this case, g  46.8, indicating that mutually cooper-
ative choices were rationally sensible and beneficial to
both parties.
After even-numbered rounds participants could send a
written message to the other party. At each opportunity,
the program sent a message (see Table 1). Prior to the
breach, each of the program’s messages expressed con-
tentment with the process and intent to continue. After
Round 5 the experimenter announced that, to speed things
up, participants would make choices for two rounds at a
time: Participants then indicated their choices for Rounds
6 and 7. In short interactions, the program immediately
defected, making two Right choices. In long interactions,
the program continued to make cooperative Left choices
until it defected on Rounds 16 and 17.
To ensure that cooperation had been fully extinguished
prior to the penance manipulation, four rounds of non-
cooperative, programmed choices followed the breach. If
participants shifted to noncooperation immediately after
the breach, then small penance was equivalent to the pro-
gram accepting a loss equal to half of the participant’s
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loss; large penance was equivalent to the program ac-
cepting a loss equal to the participant’s loss. In neither
case would penance restore the points the participant
would have received if the two players had continued to
choose cooperatively. Also, if participants did not re-
spond by choosing noncooperatively immediately, then
small and large penance provided even less compensation
relative to the loss.
Four rounds of single choices allowed for the delivery
of all but one act of penance (an open request for five
rounds of maximum payoffs). Then the experimenter an-
nounced a total of five more rounds, played one at a time.
Thus, participants had nine rounds of choices after the
penance manipulation, some of which included penance.
Every interaction had at least five postpenance choices.
After the last round, participants completed a short ques-
tionnaire assessing their attitudes, perceptions of the other
player, and emotions. The experiment concluded with a
thorough debriefing.
Design and Analysis
The original experiment was a 2 (denial or acknowledg-
ment of intent)  2 (short or long duration)  4 (mere
talk, small, large, or open penance) factorial design, with
all variables between subjects. Participants’ choices on
the last five rounds (when mutual noncooperation was the
only equilibrium) were the primary dependent variables.
We also noted whether choices were cooperative on the
last round and whether participants chose noncoopera-
tively on all of the last five rounds.
We transcribed participants’ messages and used a sim-
ple coding scheme to count their responses. Most models
of the repeated prisoners’ dilemma suggest that people
should (and do) use contingent strategies such as tit-for-
tat; thus, we counted if-then statements (e.g., “As long as
you choose up, I’ll choose left.”) prior to the breach, after
the breach but prior to penance, and after penance. We
also noted the timing of messages mentioning “trust” as
well as any instances of disparagement or derision (e.g.,
“you jerk!”), economic arguments (e.g., “the numbers are
clear: up-left gives both of us the best chance of winning
the $10”), and accusations of lying.
Given our model, a direct measure of forgiveness
would have been useful. However, inclusion of such an
item might signal to astute participants that the experi-
menter knew that forgiveness would be an issue. To
maintain the illusion that the other player was not pro-
grammed, we elected to rely on three questions in the
postexperimental questionnaire that asked about future
interactions with the other party (How much do you trust,
like, and want to work with this person in the future?)
and about positive and negative affect (How did you feel
during the experiment—good, distressed, aroused, sur-
prised, pleased, angry, hostile, satisfied, astonished?). All
responses were provided on five-point rating scales. A
factor analysis of the questionnaire responses led to the
formation of three affective/cognitive indices, described
below.
Results
Phrasing of the Open Form of Penance
The open penance condition led to an unexpected out-
come: Many participants simply did not respond to it,
either by not responding to the offer or not requesting any
penance. When we explored possible reasons for these
reactions, we realized that the phrasing of the offer may
have implied a shifting of responsibility. The message
apologized (“I am sorry for doing this”) and expressed an
interest in returning to mutual cooperation, but it directed
the burden of reestablishing cooperation to the victim by
asking, “What will it take for you to cooperate again?”
We therefore added a new form of open penance that
no longer shifted responsibility to the victim. Forty new
participants (recruited exactly as we had recruited the
original sample) experienced a condition in which the de-
fector’s open offer of penance accepted personal respon-
sibility. It now read, “What can I do to get you to coop-
erate again?”
This new form of open penance led to a change in our
data analysis strategy. We analyzed the three fixed pen-
ance conditions (mere talk, small penance, and large pen-
ance) and three open penance conditions (the original
with and without requests for penance and the new form)
in separate analyses. (This was a conservative strategy
because an overall analysis including both fixed and open
conditions would have generated many effects and in-
flated the apparent significance of the data.)
The open penance condition now included three levels:
participants from the original open penance condition
who did not respond to the open offer (Open/No Ask);
those who did respond (Open/Ask); and the new partici-
pants (Responsible/Open condition). The open/ask and
responsible/open conditions also created an additional de-
pendent variable, i.e., how much penance the participants
requested. We analyzed this measure as a function of in-
tention and duration.
Control Checks and Affective/Cognitive Measures
We conducted two analyses to insure that, apart from the
manipulation of the independent variables, all of the con-
ditions were similar. Analysis of cooperative choices on
the first five rounds indicates that the great majority were
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Table 2 Descriptive Statistics and Intercorrelations of the Dependent Measures for Fixed and Open Forms of Penance
Form Intercorrelations
Max Fixed Mean SD Open Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 Initial Cooperation 5 4.67 0.95 4.54 0.99 — 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.26* 0.36** 0.28
2 Extinction Trials 6 1.95 1.63 2.19 1.26 0.11 — 0.07 0.13 0.16 0.03 0.04
3 Final Cooperation 5 2.89 1.83 2.88 1.85 0.06 0.19 — 0.03 0.32** 0.14 0.48**
4 Expected Relations 15 9.18 3.15 11.07 2.90 0.08 0.06 0.24** — 0.15 0.14 0.52**
5 Positive Emotions 15 10.25 3.00 9.87 2.80 0.07 0.01 0.23** 0.10 — 0.02 0.20
6 Negative Emotions 25 13.8 4.35 15.42 3.92 0.14* 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.07 — 0.24
7 Penance Requested 5 — — 2.30 1.32 — — — — — — —
Note. Fixed penance condition correlations are printed below the main diagonal (n 142); open penance conditions are printed above the
main diagonal (n  83). Coefficient alphas for the fixed and open penance conditions were 0.86 and 0.78 for positive emotions, 0.71 and
0.67 for negative emotions, and 0.88 and 0.89 for expected relations. Also, for the relations index, smaller numbers indicate a more positive
relations; for emotions, larger numbers indicate more positive and more negative emotions.
*p  0.05; **p  0.01.
cooperative (the grand mean was 4.62). The rates of ini-
tial cooperation did not vary by condition. Also, analysis
of the number of rounds needed to extinguish cooperation
after the breach revealed no significant effects in the anal-
ysis of fixed penance forms. There was one significant
effect in the analysis of open penance, the intent by du-
ration by penance interaction, F(2,71) 4.26, p  0.05.
This effect depended on two sparse, open/ask conditions
(n  3 in each case) and may therefore not be reliable.
Collectively, these results indicate little variation in co-
operation across conditions prior to the penance manip-
ulation.
Factor analysis of the questionnaire items led to a three-
factor solution. (A maximum likelihood procedure
yielded eigenvalues of 13.48, 7.09, 5.97, 0.74, and 0.37.
A promax rotation yielded three factors with loadings ex-
ceeding 0.30 for each item within a factor.) The factors
were positive emotions (good, pleased, and satisfied),
negative emotions (distressed, angry, hostile, astonished,
and surprised), and a more complex relations factor (trust,
liking, and future interaction). Indices were created by
summing the responses of each item within each factor.
The scales were internally consistent (see Table 2) and
were treated as separate dependent measures.
Table 2 also presents the means and intercorrelations
of the attitudinal responses and the three measures of co-
operation, as well as the size of the penance requested in
the open penance conditions. Relations and positive emo-
tions were significantly related to cooperative choices, as
were cooperative choices after the breach but prior to pen-
ance. More notable are the significant negative correla-
tions between the relations scale and both the penance
requested (following offers of open penance) and end-
game cooperative choices. Those who asked for more
penance were ultimately less cooperative and held out
worse prospects for the future interaction. Those who
asked for less, in contrast, were ultimately more cooper-
ative and had a more positive outlook on the interaction.
Behavioral and Affective Findings
Once the final period had been announced, game theory
suggests that rational players will choose noncoopera-
tively on all of the last five rounds. In fact, there were
many cooperative choices (the grand mean was 2.89).
Most participants (173 of 224; 77.2%) made at least one
cooperative choice during this period; 37.1% cooperated
on the very last round.
Analysis of the fixed penance conditions indicated a
significant main effect for penance on both cooperative
behavior and positive emotions (F(2,130) 10.20, p 
0.001, and F(2,130) 8.71, p 0.001, respectively; see
Table 3). Mere talk had a positive effect but led to sig-
nificantly fewer cooperative choices and less positive
emotion than either small or large penance. Cooperation
on the last round and the frequency of fully noncooper-
ative endgame choices follow this same pattern. Thus, the
data contradict game theory’s expectations. Mere talk
even led to cooperative choices on the last round (24%
cooperated). All of these findings clearly support Hy-
pothesis 1. Denials of intent, however, were not more
effective than acknowledging intent, either for affective
reactions or cooperative behavior. This contradicts Hy-
pothesis 2.
These data also support Hypothesis 3, that substantive
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Table 3 Mean Frequency of Endgame Cooperation, Final Round Cooperation, and Complete Endgame Noncooperation as a











Mere Talk 2.16b 12/50 (24.0%) 20/50 (40.0%) 9.32b
Small Penance 3.50a 16/44 (36.4%) 5/44 (11.4%) 10.91a
Large Penance 3.32a 22/47 (46.8%) 7/47 (14.9%) 11.03a
Open Form Conditions
Open/No Ask 1.15b 6/26 (23.1%) 15/26 (57.7%) 8.85c
Open/Ask 3.00a 6/17 (35.3%) 4/17 (23.6%) 9.82b
Responsible/Open 3.85a 21/40 (52.5%) 0/40 (0.0%) 10.55a
Note. Means within the fixed or open conditions with common subscripts are not significantly different from one another using the Newman-
Keuls procedure (p  0.05).
#These means ranged from 3 to 15, with larger means signifying more positive emotions.
offers of penance would be more effective than bald apol-
ogies. Cooperation and positive affect were significantly
greater in the small and large penance conditions than
they were for mere talk. The data do not support Hypoth-
esis 4, however, which predicted that larger offers of pen-
ance would be more effective than smaller offers. Instead,
the data document a sharp difference between substantive
and nonsubstantive penance.
Analysis of the open conditions indicated significant
main effects for both final cooperative choices and posi-
tive emotions for penance (F(1,71)  21.73, p  0.001
and F(2,71)  3.79, p  0.05, respectively), as well as
two interactions for final cooperative choices, between
explanations and duration (F(1,71)  4.28, p  0.05)
and explanations and penance (F(2,71)  4.00, p 
0.05). The means for the main effects (see Table 3) in-
dicate that the responsible/open condition led to some-
what more cooperation than the open/ask condition and
both led to significantly more cooperation and positive
emotion than the open/no ask condition. The effects for
final round cooperation and complete endgame nonco-
operation also suggest stronger positive effects for re-
sponsible/open offers.
The significant interactions support the behavioral por-
tions of Hypotheses 5 and 6: The explanations by duration
interaction (see Table 4) show that acknowledging non-
cooperative intent was more effective in reestablishing
cooperation in short interactions and that denying non-
cooperative intent was more effective (but not signifi-
cantly) in reestablishing cooperation in longer interac-
tions. The data also suggest that short interactions led
participants who were offered open penance to be more
sensitive to expressed intentions than similar participants
in longer interactions.
The explanations by penance interaction (see Table 4)
indicate that open penance had its strongest behavioral
effects when it accompanied a credible message that de-
nied responsibility. As previously noted, some of the
original open offers failed to generate a request for pen-
ance. When denials of intent led to no response to an open
offer of penance, the likelihood of future cooperation was
extremely low (a mean of 0.73 cooperative choices in the
last five rounds), suggesting that these participants did not
believe the denials. In contrast, participants who re-
quested penance or those who received a responsible/
open offer of penance were more likely to cooperate fol-
lowing a denial. Thus, it appears that believable denials
in the open penance conditions were more effective in
reestablishing cooperation than acknowledgments, sup-
porting the thrust of interactional justice research and
demonstrating its impact on actual behavior. Simulta-
neously, however, denials meant greater risk: If they were
not believed, they appear to have been less effective than
acknowledgments of intent.
Hypothesis 7 predicted that open offers of penance
would be more effective than fixed offers. The data in-
dicate that, overall, open offers led to a mean of 2.83
cooperative choices and that fixed offers led to a mean of
2.96 cooperative choices. There were also no significant
differences in participants’ affective reactions. Thus, Hy-
pothesis 7 was not supported.
Hypothesis 8 predicted that open offers of penance
would generate requests for repayment that were smaller
than the costs originally imposed by the harm. The data
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Table 4 Analysis of the Impact of the Open Form of
Penance on Cooperative Choice
(a) Mean cooperative choices under the open form of penance as








(b) Mean cooperative choices and simple effects analyses for the








Open F 1 p
Acknowledge 2.09 2.73 3.74 5.07 0.05
SD 2.11 2.05 0.73
n 11 11 19
Deny 0.73 3.5 3.95 23.8 0.001
SD 1.49 1.87 0.97
n 15 6 21
Note. Means with different subscripts differ significantly (p  0.05).
1df (2, 71).
indicate that in the original open condition the mean re-
quest was for 0.42 maximum payoffs (i.e., s/he chooses
Down and the program chooses Left), including many
nonresponses. In the responsible/open condition, the
mean was 1.45 maximum payoffs requested. Analysis of
the requests in the open/ask and responsible/open con-
ditions yielded a main effect for duration, F(1,49) 
5.29, p  0.05, and a significant interaction between in-
tent and duration, F(1,49) 4.97, p  0.05. Short inter-
actions led to larger average requests (2.63 maxima) than
longer interactions (1.87), particularly for denials, where
the mean requests for penance were 3.00 and 1.33, re-
spectively. In contrast, acknowledging intent led to rela-
tively consistent requests for penance (2.33 and 2.40
rounds). Given that all of the participants suffered two
rounds of mutually noncooperative outcomes (payoffs of
0.03 rather than 3.6 from mutual cooperation) and each
maximum outcome only provided payoffs of 4.0, Hy-
pothesis 8 is clearly supported: They did not ask for
enough to cover the costs that they had suffered.
Written Messages
Throughout the experiment, most participants used if-
then statements suggesting contingent or strategic moves:
of 182 participants who sent messages, 138 (76%) sent
if-then statements before the breach, 135 (74%) sent if-
then statements just after the breach, and 151 (83%), a
slight increase, sent them after penance was offered. No
systematic patterns between the conditions are discerni-
ble.
Forty-nine participants in the short interactions (50.5%)
made economic arguments, compared to 35 (41.2%) in the
long. Disparaging remarks were considerably more fre-
quent in the long interactions (n 34; 40%) than in the
short (n  24; 24.7%), as were accusations of lying (n
 13 in longer interactions, n  3 in shorter interac-
tions). These data suggest that breaches in longer inter-
actions led to more emotional reactions than breaches in
shorter interactions.
Participants’ messages after the breach were frequently
angry or provocative. In addition to illuminating their
feelings, they also provide a check on the effectiveness
of the explanation and duration manipulations. While
many denials prompted incredulous responses (e.g.,
“Yeah, right. I bet he took the wrong card”), none of the
acknowledged defections led to such vehement reactions.
Trust was frequently mentioned in their messages, but
rarely before the breach or during the endgame. Instead,
trust was most often mentioned after the breach. In the
shorter interactions trust messages peaked in frequency
at Round 13, just after the offer of penance. The message
was generally a matter-of-fact reaction: “We had a trust.
You should be more confident!” “Big loss for a little
trust!” “Just as I was beginning to trust you!” In the longer
interactions, the peak frequency occurred in Round 17,
immediately following the breach. These comments ques-
tioned the counterpart’s intelligence and morality, ex-
emplifying the bewilderment described by Lewicki and
Bunker’s (1996) discussion of breakdowns in more es-
tablished relationships. “How awful! We’re against the
other team not each other. You broke the trust factor.”
“What happened? Violation of trust compromises your
integrity.” “I expect your honesty in business. You are
very foolish. If you’d maintained my trust, you’d have
made a lot more money.” These data are consistent with
our earlier interpretation of the effects of denial and
acknowledgment. In the shorter interactions, trust became
important when penance was offered (i.e., it helped
resolve uncertainty); in the longer interactions, trust ap-
pears to have been most important exactly when it was
breached.
Both sets of messages fit Morrison and Robinson’s
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(1997) model of betrayal. A breach early in the interac-
tion seemed to lead to cognitive rather than emotional
reactions. A breach later in the interaction was more se-
rious, prompting both cognitive and emotional reactions.
The tenor of these messages conveys the fundamental sig-
nificance of duration in the development of a cooperative
interaction and its impact on the credibility of subsequent
explanations (even in a short experiment).
In sum, the messages suggest that the short interactions
led to more matter-of-fact and economically oriented re-
sponses and, possibly as a result, larger demands for pen-
ance. The longer interactions generated firmer expecta-
tions and more emotional reactions; they were obviously
successful in generating a stronger connection between
the participants.
Discussion
The results indicate that apologies and simple explana-
tions were effective at reestablishing cooperation and in-
creasing positive reactions (supporting Hypothesis 1) but
that, overall, denials were no more effective than ac-
knowledgments of noncooperative intent (rejecting Hy-
pothesis 2). Substantive amends had more positive effects
than explanations (supporting Hypothesis 3), but small
offers of penance were as effective as larger offers (re-
jecting Hypothesis 4). Acknowledgments were more ef-
fective than denials in short interactions and denials were
more effective than acknowledgments in longer interac-
tions (supporting Hypothesis 5 and Hypothesis 6). Mere
talk was sufficient to generate cooperation sometimes
even on the last trial, a particularly stringent test because
there is no opportunity for further reciprocity. Open offers
of penance were not more effective than fixed offers (re-
jecting Hypothesis 7), although they did elicit requests
for penance that were less than the injured parties’ costs
(supporting Hypothesis 8). This is consistent with evi-
dence on the mild responses to similar types of offerings
made in oral histories of clan-based societies (Boehm
1984) and among other species (de Waal 1989).
Responsible/open offers led to positive affect and con-
siderable cooperation, albeit with considerable risk.
These results show that explanations can influence be-
havior as well as perceptions and attitudes. They also doc-
ument the important positive effects of substantive and
open offers of penance on the reestablishment of coop-
eration. Once breached, cooperation can be rebuilt. Ac-
tions, explanations, and apologies all augment the process
in important and sometimes subtle ways.
The form taken by different offers of penance was an
important factor in this experiment, having a strong im-
pact on all of the dependent measures. Some of the effects
were predicted, including the positive impact of fixed
penance on cooperative behavior and positive emotions.
Other effects were surprising. Offers to take a small fixed
penalty proved just as effective in rebuilding cooperation
as larger offers. Open offers required linguistic finesse to
be effective: When they implied an acceptance of re-
sponsibility, they were much more effective in rebuilding
cooperation.
Previous studies have shown that an explanation that
denies intent can mute negative reactions (e.g., Shapiro
et al. 1994). This study also documented the effectiveness
of denials, but only in particular conditions: Believable
denials were somewhat (but not significantly) more ef-
fective than acknowledgments. They were also more ef-
fective in longer interactions and less effective when they
were not coupled with substantive penance.
On average, participants continued cooperating for just
over two rounds after their counterpart had defected. On
the one hand, this suggests some tolerance on their part;
on the other, it gave them more zero payoffs than we had
intended (an average of four) as well as two small payoffs
(of 0.03, for mutual noncooperation) prior to the offer of
penance. Because the fixed penance offers were only one
or two rounds of maximum payoffs, they could not make
up for participants’ losses. Instead, penance in this ex-
periment seemed to represent a signal of a genuine com-
mitment toward mutual cooperation (e.g., Pilisuk et al.
1967). The fact that penance was substantive, however
minimally, seems to have been critical, as it helped gen-
erate considerably more cooperation than mere talk.
Extrapolations from anthropological studies led us to
predict that open offers of penance would be particularly
effective. Our original manipulation, however, was only
successful when it prompted a response. Subtle rewording
of the offer from “What will it take?” to “What can I do?”
had important effects on both cooperation and positive
affect, as well as on the victims’ requests for penance. It
led to the highest frequencies of overall and last-round
cooperation that we observed. These results reinforce the
notion that forgiveness and reestablishing mutual coop-
eration depend on both the penitent and the victim be-
cause the participants who did respond to “What will it
take?” offers were also relatively cooperative in the end-
game. The fact that open offers of penance were no more
effective than small, fixed offers of penance also rein-
forces the notion that the symbolic nature of substantive
penance may be more important than its size.
The effects of mere talk were material: A simple apol-
ogy led to quite a few cooperative choices on the last five
rounds (24%; see Table 3) and enhanced the positive af-
fect. These effects may be due to the fact that mutual
cooperation in these interactions provided participants
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with considerable potential gain. Interactions where co-
operation is less profitable and riskier may well reduce
the effectiveness of talk on its own. The potential gen-
erality of the current results could be augmented consid-
erably by additional research that varies the context. For
a start, this might mean investigating other sets of pay-
offs. Although we manipulated five different types of
penance, we studied only one set of payoffs in a single
experiment. Other payoff contingencies might lead to dif-
ferent effects.
Future research might also include direct measures of
forgiveness. We did not use such measures here because
we hoped to maintain the illusion of unprogrammed, real
counterparts. Prior research on the correlates of forgive-
ness indicated that positive affect, negative affect, and
future intentions could provide indirect indicators of for-
giveness. The results do indicate that penance influenced
positive affect and that affect was correlated in the ex-
pected directions with endgame cooperation. The affec-
tive indicators, however, do not directly track levels of
endgame cooperation. This could mean that the act and
state of forgiveness is sufficient but not necessary to re-
building cooperation in interactions like these. This con-
clusion must be hedged, though, because it is also likely
that the affect measures used here may not have been
sufficiently sensitive to detect temporal variations in af-
fect that would characterize forgiveness. Participants in
this study responded to global indicators of positive and
negative affect experienced over the entire set of plays.
Future research should employ more direct measures of
forgiveness and more temporally sensitive indicators of
affect.
Other limitations of the current study reflect some of
the general limitations of experimental research, i.e.,
short, straightforward interactions that are not based on
face-to-face experience, relatively small payoffs, and
knowledge that one is behaving in an experiment. More
serious breaches of cooperation, however, would strain
the bounds of ethical research. Thus, keeping things con-
tained within an experimental setting allowed this study
to be conducted. It also allowed us to measure a variety
of cognitive and emotional reactions, as well as actual
behavior.
Conclusions
Effective relationship management is critical to success
in business, inside organizations, and even in politics.
One of the more subtle and difficult elements of relation-
ship management is the inevitable friction that arises and
threatens ongoing cooperation. Our analysis of the dy-
namics of defection and penance began with a focus on
the type of explanation provided by the party that initiated
noncooperative action. Past research has documented the
benefits of external explanations in blunting negative per-
ceptions. We found a similar pattern—for those who had
been involved in relatively long, cooperative interactions.
In short interactions, acknowledgments actually proved
more effective at blunting negative reactions. The re-
peated dilemma framework allowed us to extend these
findings beyond perceptions, showing that the proper
combinations of explanation and substantive penance can
contribute to reestablishing actual cooperative behavior.
This research also identifies some forms of substantive
penance that can be critical to this process.
These findings highlight the tight connection between
the nature of an interaction and the explanations that are
needed to rebuild cooperation following a breach. Defec-
tors were most effective at restoring cooperation in short
interactions when they acknowledged intent and also pre-
sented an effective, open offer of penance (i.e., one that
generated a response from the participant). This strategy
led to smaller requests for penalties. With breakdowns in
longer interactions leading to emotional reactions, denials
of intent were more effective, even the same type of de-
nial that was so easily questioned in shorter interactions.
The strength of the reactions observed here, as well as
the behavioral effects, suggests that the duration of a posi-
tive interaction is very important. People do not expect
or value the same type of explanation from a new ac-
quaintance or a new colleague as they do from someone
whom they have known for a long time. Denials of un-
expected negative actions are more easily accepted when
they come from a well-known other. In contrast, accept-
ing blame may create better prospects for future cooper-
ation in short interactions. By admitting a mistake, a per-
son acknowledges their fallibility and may even generate
increased attraction. Similar actions taken by organiza-
tional members following negative outcomes also appear
to be tremendously effective (cf. Elsbach 1994).
From an interactional justice perspective, the current
findings are counterintuitive. Previous justice research
has focused on explanations that are meant to deny either
intent or foreseeability. The current findings show that in
particular situations, i.e., first-time short interactions,
open admissions of intent may be more effective than
weak attempts at denial. This opens new avenues for re-
search on the boundary conditions of the effectiveness of
admissions of guilt. In particular, future research might
attempt to identify when admissions of intent will be
more effective than adequate denials and exactly when,
over the course of an interaction, denials become more
effective than admissions.
The data further show that some form of substantive
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penance greatly enhances an explanation’s effectiveness.
The nature of penance is critical to current and future
interactions. We originally hypothesized that open offers
of penance would provide the ideal mechanism for cre-
ating voice and modulating egocentric perceptions of fair-
ness. Although they were effective when they generated
a response, the frequent breakdowns in the original open
condition were particularly revealing. In a difficult inter-
personal atmosphere, offers of penance that seem insin-
cere (the open/no ask condition) can further increase an-
tagonism and accentuate a breakdown in cooperation. In
contrast, simply volunteering small amounts of substan-
tive penance was particularly effective. Experience with
similar (uncontrolled) breaches in classroom prisoners’
dilemma exercises (Malhotra and Murnighan 2001) sug-
gests that the voluntary nature of penance may be critical.
Requests for penance by wronged parties may be much
less effective in restoring future cooperation than spon-
taneous offers of penance by defectors. This hypothesis
is worthy of future research.
In this study, most of the requests for penance in the
open condition approximated the penance paid in the
fixed, small penance condition. This similarity may not
be coincidental because it seems that any substantive pen-
ance may be sufficient to resurrect cooperation. Future
research might establish whether and how much this ob-
servation generalizes because a limit (e.g., breaches that
cause truly serious losses) seems likely.
This study was formulated to investigate the effects of
opportunistic actions on cooperation and, more impor-
tantly, to determine whether different forms of penance
might be effective in restoring mutual cooperation. The
findings are clear: Small substantive offers of penance led
to significant increases in future cooperation. Although
the study did not directly address the issue of trust, par-
ticipants often raised it. Rather than early or late in an
interaction, issues of trust most often surfaced shortly af-
ter the breach. Messages about trust could indicate a gen-
uine belief by the participants that they had an under-
standing with the other party. They might also be a verbal
place marker for more complex messages. The current
data call into question the claim that, once broken, trust
cannot be repaired (Rempel et al. 1985). They also open
avenues for further research to address the long-run costs
of different kinds of breaches.
The data also invite new conceptualizations of the dy-
namics of forgiveness, penance, and reconciliation. Be-
cause conflict is an inevitable human state, violated ex-
pectations are a normal part of interpersonal interaction.
This study suggests that acknowledging responsibility for
a harmful act can be quite effective in starting the process
of reconciliation, especially when denial might prompt
disbelief. Voluntary substantive offers of penance seem
to provide particularly clear and strong foundations for
rebuilding cooperation.
These results are particularly pertinent given the grow-
ing importance of managing complex interpersonal ties
within and between organizations and their members.
Strong and weak ties have direct influences on both an
individual’s organizational success and on the healthy
maintenance of organizational alliances (Krackhardt
1992). Given the findings that show that the expression
of interindividual conflicts can contribute to the break-
down of broader organizational ties (Larson 1992), re-
building cooperation may often be necessary for organi-
zational success.
The optimistic implication of our results is that rees-
tablishing cooperation is clearly possible. Joint ventures,
cross-functional collaborations, and intergroup coordi-
nation need not break down irrevocably because of con-
flict between individuals. Questions about the restoration
of trust and the avoidance of potential breakdowns remain
for future research. The current findings provide both
hope and direction by identifying some of the subtleties
and nuances of reestablishing cooperation. A difficult bar-
rier to overcome may be the natural disinclination of in-
dividuals who have violated other’s expectations to will-
ingly offer and accept penance. As the current research
suggests, such entreaties must also prompt positive re-
actions from victims. The need for harmdoers to adopt a
sequence of substantive, subtle action following the
breach of a positive, cooperative interaction may pose a
serious obstacle to the reconciliation of cooperative in-
teractions and the reestablishment of trust. As the impor-
tance of relational ties increases, both within and between
organizations, these and a whole host of related issues
will become even more critical.
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